State Prescription Drug Purchases. Pricing Standards. Initiative Statute. by unknown
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Propositions California Ballot Propositions and Initiatives
2016
State Prescription Drug Purchases. Pricing
Standards. Initiative Statute.
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props
This Proposition is brought to you for free and open access by the California Ballot Propositions and Initiatives at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Propositions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
State Prescription Drug Purchases. Pricing Standards. Initiative Statute. California Proposition 61 (2016).
http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/1354
61
72 | Title and Summary / Analysis
PROPOSITION STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PURCHASES. PRICING STANDARDS.  
INITIATIVE STATUTE.61
OFFICIAL TITLE AND SUMMARY P R E P A R E D  B Y  T H E  A T T O R N E Y  G E N E R A L
ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
BACKGROUND
The State Payments for Prescription Drugs
State Pays for Prescription Drugs Under Many 
Different State Programs. Typically, the state 
pays for prescription drugs under programs that 
provide health care or health insurance to certain 
state populations. For example, the state pays 
for prescription drugs through the health care 
coverage it provides to the state’s low-income 
residents through the Medi-
Cal program and to current 
and retired state employees. 
The state also provides and 
pays for the health care of 
prison inmates, including 
their prescription drug 
costs.
State Pays for Prescription 
Drugs in a Variety of Ways. 
In some cases, the state 
purchases prescription 
drugs directly from drug 
manufacturers. In other 
cases, the state pays 
for prescription drugs 
even though it is not 
the direct purchaser of 
them. For example, the 
state reimburses retail 
pharmacies for the cost 
of prescription drugs 
purchased by the pharmacies and dispensed to 
individuals enrolled in certain state programs.
Annual State Drug Expenditures Totaled Almost 
$3.8 Billion in 2014–15. As shown in Figure 1, the 
state spent almost $3.8 billion on prescription 
drugs in 2014–15 under a variety of state 
programs. State funds pay for roughly half of 
overall state prescription drug spending, and the 
remainder is paid with federal and other nonstate 
revenues.
• Prohibits state agencies from buying any 
prescription drug from a drug manufacturer 
at any price over the lowest price paid for the 
same drug by the United States Department of 
Veterans Affairs, except as may be required by 
federal law.  
• Applies to any program where the state agency 
is the ultimate payer for a prescription drug, 
even if the state agency does not itself buy the 
drug.  
• Exempts purchases of prescription drugs 
under managed care programs funded through 
Medi-Cal.
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S ESTIMATE OF NET 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL IMPACT:
• Potential for state savings of an unknown 
amount depending on (1) how the measure’s 
implementation challenges are addressed 
and (2) the responses of drug manufacturers 
regarding the provision and pricing of their 
drugs.
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Prescription Drug Pricing in General
Prices Actually Paid Often Differ From the Drugs’ 
“List Prices.” Prescription drugs sold in the United 
States have list prices that are similar to the 
manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) for 
automobiles. Purchasers of the drugs typically 
negotiate the prices and often receive discounts. 
As a result, the final price paid for a prescription 
drug is typically lower than its list price. 
Different Payers Often Pay Different Prices for 
the Same Prescription Drug. Often there is no 
single price paid by all payers for a particular 
prescription drug. Instead, different payers may 
regularly pay different prices for the same drug, 
which reflects the results of negotiations between 
the drugs’ buyers and sellers. For example, two 
different insurance companies may pay different 
prices for the same drug, as may two separate 
state agencies such as the California Department 
of Health Care Services (DHCS) and the California 
Department of Public Health. 
Prices Paid for Prescription Drugs Are Often Subject 
to Confidentiality Agreements. Prescription drug 
purchase agreements often contain confidentiality 
clauses that are intended to prohibit public 
disclosure of the agreed prices. As a result, the 
prescription drug prices paid by a particular 
entity, including a government agency, may be 
unavailable to the public. 
State Prescription Drug Pricing
State Strategies to Reduce Prescription Drug 
Prices. California state agencies pursue a 
variety of strategies to reduce the prices they 
pay for prescription drugs, which typically 
involve negotiating with drug manufacturers 
and wholesalers. The particular strategies vary 
depending on program structure and the manner 
in which the state programs pay for drugs. For 
example, multiple California state departments 
jointly negotiate drug prices with manufacturers. 
By negotiating as a single, larger entity, the 
participating state departments are able to obtain 
lower drug prices. Another state strategy is to 
negotiate discounts from drug manufacturers in 
exchange for reducing the overall administrative 
burden on doctors prescribing these 
manufacturers’ drugs.
United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 
Prescription Drug Pricing
VA Provides Health Care to Veterans. The 
VA provides comprehensive health care to 
approximately nine million veterans nationwide. 
In doing so, the VA generally purchases the 
prescription drugs that it makes available to VA 
health care beneficiaries.
Programs to Reduce Federal Prescription Drug 
Expenditures. The federal government has 
established discount programs that place upper 
limits on the prices paid for prescription drugs by 
selected federal payers, including the VA. These 
programs generally result in lower prices than 
those available to private payers. 
VA Obtains Additional Discounts From Drug 
Manufacturers or Sellers. On top of the federal 
discount programs described above, the VA 
often negotiates additional discounts from drug 
manufacturers or sellers that lower its prices 
below what other federal departments pay. 
Manufacturers or sellers provide these discounts 
in return for their drugs being made readily 
available to VA patients.
VA Publishes Some of Its Prescription Drug Pricing 
Information. The VA maintains a public database 
that lists the prices paid by the VA for most of the 
prescription drugs it purchases. According to the 
VA, however, the database may not display the 
lowest prices paid for some of the drugs for which 
the VA obtains additional negotiated discounts. 
The VA may not publish this pricing information 
in the database due to confidentiality clauses 
that are included in certain drugs’ purchase 
agreements and are intended to prohibit public 
disclosure of the negotiated prices. 
PROPOSAL
Measure Sets an Upper Limit on Amount State Can 
Pay for Prescription Drugs. This measure generally 
prohibits state agencies from paying more for a 
prescription drug than the lowest price paid by 
the VA for the same drug after all discounts are 
factored in for both California state agencies and 
the VA.
61
74 | Title and Summary / Analysis
ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST C O N T I N U E D
PROPOSITION STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PURCHASES. PRICING STANDARDS.  
INITIATIVE STATUTE.61
Measure Applies Whenever the State Is the Payer of 
Prescription Drugs. The measure’s upper limit on 
state prescription drug prices applies regardless 
of how the state pays for the prescription drugs. It 
applies, for example, whether the state purchases 
prescription drugs directly from a manufacturer or 
instead reimburses pharmacies for the drugs they 
provide to enrollees of state programs. 
Measure Exempts a Portion of the State’s Largest 
Health Care Program From Its Drug Pricing 
Requirements. The state’s Medi-Cal program offers 
comprehensive health coverage to the state’s low-
income residents. The state operates Medi-Cal 
under two distinct service delivery systems: the 
fee-for-service system (which serves approximately 
25 percent of Medi-Cal enrollees) and the 
managed care system (which serves approximately 
75 percent of enrollees). While the measure 
applies to the fee-for-service system, it exempts 
the managed care system from its drug pricing 
requirements described above. 
DHCS Required to Verify That State Agencies 
Are Complying With Measure’s Drug Pricing 
Requirements. The measure requires DHCS to 
verify that state agencies are paying the same 
or less than the lowest price paid by the VA on a 
drug-by-drug basis.
FISCAL EFFECTS
By prohibiting the state from paying more for 
a prescription drug than the lowest price paid 
by the VA, there is the potential for the state to 
realize reductions in its drug costs. There are, 
however, major uncertainties concerning (1) the 
implementation of the measure’s lowest-cost 
requirement and (2) how drug manufacturers 
would respond in the market. We discuss these 
concerns below.
Potential Implementation Challenges  
Create Fiscal Uncertainty
Some VA Drug Pricing Information May Not Be 
Publicly Accessible. The measure generally 
requires that the prescription drug prices paid 
by the state not exceed the lowest prices paid by 
the VA on a drug-by-drug basis. As mentioned 
above, the VA’s public database information on 
the prices of the prescription drugs it purchases 
does not always identify the lowest prices the VA 
pays. This is because, at least for some drugs, 
the VA has negotiated a lower price than that 
shown in the public database and is keeping that 
pricing information confidential. It is uncertain 
whether the VA could be nonetheless required 
to disclose these lower prices to an entity—such 
as DHCS—requesting such information under 
a federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request. A FOIA exemption covering trade secrets 
and financial information may apply to prevent 
the VA from having to disclose these currently 
confidential prices to the state.
Confidentiality of VA Drug Prices Could Compromise 
the State’s Ability to Implement the Measure. If 
the VA is legally allowed to keep some of its 
prescription drug pricing information confidential, 
DHCS would be unable to assess in all cases 
whether state agencies are paying less than or 
equal to the lowest price paid by the VA for the 
same drug. This would limit the state’s ability to 
implement the measure as it is written. However, 
to address challenges in implementing laws, 
courts sometimes grant state agencies latitude to 
implement laws to the degree that is practicable 
as long as implementation is consistent with the 
laws’ intent. For example, courts might allow the 
state to pay for drugs at a price not exceeding the 
lowest known price paid by the VA, rather than 
the actual lowest price, to allow the measure to be 
implemented. 
Potential Confidentiality of Lowest VA Drug Prices 
Reduces but Does Not Eliminate Potential State 
Savings. The potential confidentiality of at 
least some of the lowest VA prices reduces but 
does not eliminate the measure’s potential to 
generate savings related to state prescription 
drug spending. Though pricing information may 
be unavailable for some of the VA’s lowest-priced 
prescription drugs, publicly available VA drug 
prices have historically been lower than the 
prices paid by some California state agencies for 
some drugs. To the extent that the VA’s publicly 
available drug prices for particular drugs are lower 
than those paid by California state agencies and 
manufacturers choose to offer these prices to the 
state, the measure would help the state achieve 
prescription drug-related savings. 
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Potential Drug Manufacturer Responses  
Limit Potential Savings
Drug Manufacturer Responses Under Measure 
Could Significantly Affect Fiscal Impact. In order to 
maintain similar levels of profits on their products, 
drug manufacturers would likely take actions that 
mitigate the impact of the measure. A key reason 
why drug manufacturers might take actions in 
response to the measure relates to how federal law 
regulates state Medicaid programs’ prescription 
drug prices. (Medi-Cal is California’s Medicaid 
program.) Federal law entitles all state Medicaid 
programs to the lowest prescription drug prices 
available to most public and private payers in the 
United States (excluding certain payers, such 
as the VA). If certain California state agencies 
receive VA prices, as the measure intends, this 
would set new prescription drug price limits at VA 
prices for all state Medicaid programs. As a result, 
the measure could extend the VA’s favorable drug 
prices to health programs serving tens of millions 
of additional people nationwide, placing added 
pressure on drug manufacturers to take actions to 
protect their profits under the measure. 
Below are two possible manufacturer responses. 
(We note that manufacturers might ultimately 
pursue both strategies, while at the same time 
offering some drugs at favorable VA prices.)
• Drug Manufacturers Might Raise VA Drug 
Prices. Knowing that the measure makes 
VA prices the upper limit for what the 
state can pay, drug manufacturers might 
choose to raise VA drug prices. This would 
allow drug manufacturers to continue to 
offer prescription drugs to state agencies 
while minimizing any reductions to their 
profits. Should manufacturers respond in 
this manner, potential savings related to 
state prescription drug spending would be 
reduced. 
• Drug Manufacturers Might Decline to Offer 
Lowest VA Prices to the State for Some Drugs. 
The measure places no requirement on 
drug manufacturers to offer prescription 
drugs to the state at the lowest VA prices. 
Rather, the measure restricts actions that 
the state can take (namely, prohibiting the 
state from paying more than the lowest VA 
prices for prescription drugs). Therefore, if 
manufacturers decide it is in their interest 
not to extend the VA’s favorable pricing to 
California state agencies (for example, to 
avoid consequences such as those described 
above), drug manufacturers could decline 
to offer the state some drugs purchased by 
the VA. In such cases, these drugs would be 
unavailable to most state payers. Instead, 
the state would be limited to paying for 
drugs that either the VA does not purchase 
or drugs that manufacturers will offer at 
the lowest VA prices. (However, to comply 
with federal law, Medi-Cal might have to 
disregard the measure’s price limits and pay 
for prescription drugs regardless of whether 
manufacturers offer their drugs at or below 
VA prices.) This manufacturer response could 
reduce potential state savings under the 
measure since it might limit the drugs the 
state can pay for to those that, while meeting 
the measure’s price requirements, are 
actually more expensive than those currently 
paid for by the state. 
Summary of Overall Fiscal Effect
As discussed above, if adopted, the measure 
could generate annual state savings. However, 
the amount of any savings is highly uncertain 
as it would depend on (1) how the measure’s 
implementation challenges are addressed and 
(2) the uncertain market responses of drug 
manufacturers to the measure. As a result, the 
fiscal impact of this measure on the state is 
unknown. It could range from relatively little 
effect to significant annual savings. For example, 
if the measure lowered total state prescription 
drug spending by even a few percent, it would 
result in state savings in the high tens of millions 
of dollars annually.
Visit http://www.sos.ca.gov/measure-contributions 
for a list of committees primarily formed to support 
or oppose this measure. Visit http://www.fppc.ca.gov/
transparency/top-contributors/nov-16-gen-v2.html 
to access the committee’s top 10 contributors.
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★  ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 61  ★
★  REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 61  ★
Leading experts have rejected proponents’ claim that Prop. 
61 would somehow reduce drug prices. In fact, EXPERTS 
WARN PROP. 61 WILL INCREASE DRUG PRICES. 
The California Medical Association, the state’s foremost 
medical organization representing 41,000 doctors, says: 
“While California’s physicians are profoundly concerned 
about the affordability of prescription drugs, we evaluated 
this measure and have concluded it is deeply flawed 
and unworkable. We believe the measure would likely 
increase—not lower—state prescription drug costs.” 
The highly-respected, independent California State 
Legislative Analyst says Prop. 61 “could raise (state) 
spending on prescription drugs.” 
The California Taxpayers Association opposes Prop. 61 
because it would impose new bureaucracy and red tape, and 
cause countless lawsuits—COSTING TAXPAYERS MILLIONS. 
The Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), Department of 
California urges NO on 61 because it could jeopardize 
special discounts given to the U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs and INCREASE DRUG PRICES FOR VETERANS. 
Who’s behind this measure? 
Prop. 61 was written by Michael Weinstein, president of 
an organization that brings in $1 billion annually selling 
prescription drugs and operating HMOs. His group is 
spending millions to fund the campaign. But he exempted 
his own organization from its drug pricing provisions. He 
shouldn’t ask Californians to approve a flawed initiative he 
isn’t willing to comply with himself. 
Prop. 61 is OPPOSED BY MORE THAN 100 CALIFORNIA 
ORGANIZATIONS, including: 
• Vietnam Veterans of America, California State Council 
• California Taxpayers Association • Veterans of Foreign 
Wars (VFW), Dept. of California • California NAACP 
• American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG)—District IX/CA • California Medical Association 
Prop. 61 is deeply flawed and costly. Vote NO. 
www.NoProp61.com 
STEVE MACKEY, President 
Vietnam Veterans of America, California State Council 
WILLIAM M. REMAK, Chairman 
California Hepatitis C Task Force 
ALICE A. HUFFMAN, President 
California NAACP 
Drug companies making enormous profits from people’s 
illnesses and misery isn’t just a moral issue. Skyrocketing 
prescription drug prices are a matter of life and death. 
More Americans die of hepatitis C than from all other 
infectious diseases—EVEN THOUGH THERE’S A CURE. 
One reason? The drug company that controls it charges 
more than $1,000 per pill, out of most patients’ reach. 
That’s not the only outrageous example of drug-company 
price-gouging: 
• The price of a common infection-fighting pill was 
raised overnight from $13.50 to $750—nearly a 5000% 
increase. • The average annual cost of widely-used 
specialty drugs is estimated at $53,000—greater than 
the nation’s median household income ($52,000) and 
almost 3 1/2 times larger than average annual Social 
Security benefits of $15,000. • One cancer drug costs 
$300,000 a year. 
The drug companies put profits over people, returns 
for stockholders over cures for patients. What good are 
miraculous, life-saving medications, if they’re priced so 
high patients can’t afford them—and thousands are dying 
as a result? 
Proposition 61, The California Drug Price Relief Act, 
fights back against the drug companies’ price-gouging. 
And it is expected to save lives. Here’s how it would work: 
The Act would require the State of California to negotiate 
with drug companies for prices that are no more than the 
amounts paid for the same drugs by the U.S. Dept. of 
Veterans Affairs (DVA). 
Why the Dept. of Veterans Affairs? Because unlike 
Medicare, the DVA negotiates for drug prices, and pays 
on average 20–24% less for medications than other 
government agencies, up to 40% less than Medicare 
Part D. The Drug Price Relief Act empowers the State 
of California, as the healthcare buyer for millions of 
Californians, to negotiate the same or even better deals for 
taxpayers, which could save billions in healthcare costs. 
Drug companies are planning to spend $100 million to 
fight this measure because they know it would cause 
downward pressure on ALL drug prices—and cut into their 
excessive profits. 
Don’t just take our word for it, a publication for drug 
executives called Prop. 61 “GROUND ZERO” in the 
national fight for lower drug prices, warning: 
“If the voters of California approve this 
proposition . . . [it] would no doubt cause an immediate 
demand for the same VA discount rate to be made 
available to other states, the federal government, and 
likely private [health plan] entities, as well. IN SHORT [IT] 
WOULD BE A PRICING DISASTER FOR THE ENTIRE U.S. 
DRUG INDUSTRY.” 
But a “pricing disaster” for drug companies would equal 
price relief for hard-pressed consumers. 
Prop. 61 is strongly supported by the 86,000-member 
California Nurses Association—the largest healthcare-
provider organization in the state; AARP, the largest 
retirees’ group in California, with 3.3 million members; 
the Urban League; the Campaign for a Healthy California, 
including many labor unions; Progressive Democrats 
of America; Sen. Bernie Sanders; former U.S. Labor 
Secretary Robert Reich; and many others. 
JOIN US IN FIGHTING AGAINST HIGH DRUG 
PRICES AND DRUG COMPANY GREED. VOTE YES 
ON PROPOSITION 61. For more information, go to 
www.StopPharmaGreed.com. 
ZENEI CORTEZ, RN, Co-President 
California Nurses Association/National Nurses Organizing 
Committee 
NANCY McPHERSON, State Director 
AARP California 
SENATOR ART TORRES,(Ret.), Chair 
California Democratic Party (1996–2009) 
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★  ARGUMENT AGAINST PROPOSITION 61  ★
★  REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT AGAINST PROPOSITION 61  ★
The drug companies want you to believe they’re opposing 
Prop. 61 because it wouldn’t cover every drug purchase 
in California. That’s as laughable as the NRA saying it 
opposes an assault-weapons ban because it doesn’t cover 
enough different kinds of guns. 
THE DRUG COMPANIES ARE ONLY CONCERNED 
ABOUT MAINTAINING THEIR EXORBITANT PRICES AND 
PROFITS, PURE AND SIMPLE! 
Don’t be fooled by their expected $100-million campaign of 
distortion and mistruths. Voting against 61 only allows the 
drug companies to continue ripping off you and your family. 
Despite what they’re telling voters, there’s a reason the No 
on Prop. 61 campaign is FUNDED ALMOST ENTIRELY 
BY OUT-OF-STATE DRUG COMPANIES. Here’s what 
drugmakers are telling themselves, in publications like 
Pharmaceutical Executive: 
“It’s pretty clear that if this California pricing proposition 
passes, ALL HELL MAY BREAK LOOSE FOR THE AMERICAN 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY . . . It would shake the 
rafters of every single public state drug program in the nation, 
as well as the federal Medicaid and Medicare programs.” 
Drug companies are also unpatriotically threatening to raise 
drug prices for veterans, BUT THAT’S ANOTHER EMPTY 
THREAT. Federal law REQUIRES discounts for the Dept. 
of Veterans Affairs, drug companies aren’t selling reduced-
price drugs to veterans out of the goodness of their hearts. 
Support Prop. 61 along with: 
• California Nurses Association • AARP California • The 
Urban League • AIDS Healthcare Foundation • VoteVets 
Action Fund • Association of Asian Pacific Community 
Health Organizations • Progressive Democrats of America 
ONLY PROPOSITION 61 ALLOWS ORDINARY CITIZENS 
TO FIGHT BACK AGAINST DRUG COMPANY POWER 
AND GREED. www.StopPharmaGreed.com. 
OTTO O. YANG, M.D., Scientific Director 
AIDS Healthcare Foundation 
CAPTAIN SHAWN TERRIS,(Ret.), Chair 
California Democratic Party Veterans Caucus 
NOLAN V. ROLLINS, President 
Los Angeles Urban League/California Association of 
Urban Leagues 
Proposition 61 is a deeply flawed and costly scheme that 
is not what it seems. 
Prop. 61 was written and is being promoted by Michael 
Weinstein, the controversial president of an organization 
that brought in more than $1 billion selling prescription 
drugs and HMO policies. Suspiciously, he exempted his 
own HMO from having to comply with the measure he 
wrote and is promoting. 
• The Veterans of Foreign Wars, Department of California 
warns Prop. 61 would harm veterans. • The California 
Medical Association, representing 41,000 doctors, warns 
Prop. 61 would reduce patient access to medicines. • The 
California Taxpayers Association warns Prop. 61 would 
impose new bureaucracy, red tape and lawsuits—costing 
taxpayers millions. 
PROP. 61 DOES NOT APPLY TO 88% OF CALIFORNIANS. 
BUT IT NEGATIVELY IMPACTS ALL CALIFORNIANS 
The proposition only covers an arbitrary group of patients 
in certain state government programs, including some 
government employees and state prisoners. More than 
88% of Californians are excluded. More than 10 million 
Medi-Cal low-income patients, 20 million Californians 
with private health insurance and Medicare, and millions 
of others—ALL EXCLUDED. 
PROP. 61 COULD INCREASE PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
COSTS FOR VETERANS 
The US Department of Veterans Affairs receives special 
discounts on prescription drugs for veterans. This 
measure could result in eliminating these discounts and 
increasing prescription drug prices for veterans. That’s 
why the measure is opposed by more than a dozen 
veteran groups, including: 
• Veterans of Foreign Wars, Department of California 
• Vietnam Veterans of America, California State Council 
• American Legion, Department of California 
• AMVETS, Department of California 
DOCTORS AND PATIENT ADVOCATES SAY PROP. 61 
WOULD DISRUPT ACCESS TO NEEDED MEDICINES 
Prop. 61 would result in a new bureaucratic prior approval process 
that would interfere with patient access to needed medicines. 
Leading health groups oppose Prop. 61, including: 
• California Medical Association • American Congress of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)—District IX/CA 
• Ovarian Cancer Coalition of Greater California 
PROP. 61 WOULD LIKELY INCREASE STATE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS 
Prop. 61 would result in the elimination of drug discounts 
the state currently receives—increasing state prescription 
costs by tens of millions annually. The state’s nonpartisan 
Legislative Analyst says the measure could raise state 
spending on many prescription drugs. 
INCREASED BUREAUCRACY, RED TAPE AND HIGHER 
TAXPAYER COSTS 
The California Taxpayers Association opposes Prop. 61. 
The measure is completely vague on how it would be 
implemented. Passage of this measure would result in more 
government bureaucracy, red tape and lawsuits as state 
agencies struggle to implement it—costing taxpayers millions. 
PROMOTER WROTE IN SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR HIS 
OWN ORGANIZATION
The proponent exempted his billion dollar operation and wrote 
in provisions giving him a special right to engage in lawsuits 
regarding this measure. This provision requires California 
taxpayers to pay his lawyers—a virtual blank check. 
Proposition 61 is yet another example of a misleading and 
costly ballot measure. It would hurt veterans; jeopardize 
patient access to needed medicines; increase state 
prescription costs; and add more bureaucracy, red tape 
and lawsuits—costing taxpayers millions. 
JOIN VETERANS, DOCTORS, PATIENT ADVOCATES, 
TAXPAYER GROUPS: NO on 61. 
www.NoProp61.com 
DALE SMITH, Commander 
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Department of California 
RANDY MUNOZ, Vice Chair, Latino Diabetes Association 
GAIL NICKERSON, President 
California Association of Rural Health Clinics 
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(p) “Person” means any individual, partnership, firm, 
association, corporation, limited liability company, or other 
legal entity. 
(q) “Sexually Transmitted Infection” or “STI” means any 
infection or disease spread by sexual intercourse, 
including, but not limited to, HIV/AIDS, gonorrhea, 
syphilis, chlamydia, hepatitis, trichomoniasis, genital 
human papillomavirus infection (HPV), and genital herpes. 
SEC. 5. Liberal Construction. 
This Act is an exercise of the public power of the people of 
the State of California for the protection of their health, 
safety, and welfare, and shall be liberally construed to 
effectuate its purposes. 
SEC. 6. Conflicting Measures. 
This Act is intended to be comprehensive. It is the intent 
of the people of the State of California that in the event 
this Act and one or more measures relating to the same 
subject shall appear on the same statewide ballot, the 
provisions of the other measure or measures shall be 
deemed to be in conflict with this Act. In the event that 
this Act receives a greater number of affirmative votes, the 
provisions of this Act shall prevail in their entirety, and all 
provisions of the other measure or measures shall be null 
and void. 
SEC. 7. Proponent Accountability. 
The people of the State of California hereby declare that 
the proponent of this Act should be held civilly liable in 
the event this Act is struck down, after passage, in whole 
or in part, by a court for being constitutionally or statutorily 
impermissible. Such a constitutionally or statutorily 
impermissible initiative is a misuse of taxpayer funds and 
electoral resources and the Act’s proponent, as the drafter 
of the Act, must be held accountable for such an 
occurrence. 
In the event this Act, after passage, is struck down in 
court, in whole or in part, as unconstitutional or statutorily 
invalid, and all avenues for appealing and overturning the 
court decision have been exhausted, the proponent shall 
pay a civil penalty of $10,000 to the General Fund of the 
State of California for failure to draft a wholly constitutionally 
or statutorily permissible initiative law. No party or entity 
may waive this civil penalty. 
SEC. 8. Amendment and Repeal. 
This Act may be amended to further its purposes by statute 
passed by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Legislature and 
signed by the Governor. 
SEC. 9. Severablility. 
If any provision of this Act, or part thereof, or the
applicability of any provision or part to any person or
circumstances, is for any reason held to be invalid or
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions and parts shall
not be affected, but shall remain in full force and effect,
and to this end the provisions and parts of this Act are
severable. The voters hereby declare that this Act, and
each portion and part, would have been adopted
irrespective of whether any one or more provisions or parts










SEC. 10. Legal Defense. 
The people of the State of California desire that the Act, if 
approved by the voters, and thereafter challenged in court, 
be defended by the State of California. The people of the 
State of California, by enacting this Act, hereby declare 
that the proponent of this Act has a direct and personal 
stake in defending this Act from constitutional or statutory 
challenges to the Act’s validity. In the event the Attorney 
General fails to defend this Act; or the Attorney General 
fails to appeal an adverse judgment against the 
constitutionality or statutory permissibility of this Act, in 
whole or in part, in any court, the Act’s proponent shall be 
entitled to assert his direct and personal stake by defending 
the Act’s validity in any court and shall be empowered by 
the citizens through this Act to act as an agent of the 
citizens of the State of California subject to the following 
conditions: (1) the proponent shall not be considered an 
“at-will” employee of the State of California, but the 
Legislature shall have the authority to remove the proponent 
from his agency role by a majority vote of each house of the 
Legislature when “good cause” exists to do so, as that term 
is defined by California case law; (2) the proponent shall 
take the Oath of Office under Section 3 of Article XX of the 
California Constitution, as an employee of the State of 
California; (3) the proponent shall be subject to all 
fiduciary, ethical, and legal duties prescribed by law; and 
(4) the proponent shall be indemnified by the State of 
California for only reasonable expenses and other losses 
incurred by the proponent, as agent, in defending the 
validity of the challenged Act. The rate of indemnification 
shall be no more than the amount it would cost the State 
to perform the defense itself. 
SEC. 11. Effective Date. 
Except as otherwise provided herein, this Act shall become 
effective the day after its approval by the voters. 
PROPOSITION 61 
This initiative measure is submitted to the people in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of Article II of 
the California Constitution. 
This initiative measure adds a section to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code; therefore, new provisions proposed to be 
added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are 
new. 
PROPOSED LAW 
The California Drug Price Relief Act 






This Act shall be known, and may be cited, as “The 

California Drug Price Relief Act” (the “Act”).
 
SEC. 2. Findings and Declarations.
 
The people of the State of California hereby find and 

declare all of the following: 
(a) Prescription drug costs have been, and continue to be, 
one of the greatest drivers of rising health care costs in 
California. 
(b) Nationally, prescription drug spending increased more 
than 800 percent between 1990 and 2013, making it one 
of the fastest growing segments of health care. 
(c) Spending on specialty medications, such as those 
used to treat HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C, and cancer, are rising 
faster than other types of medications. In 2014 alone, 
total spending on specialty medications increased by more 
than 23 percent. 
(d) The pharmaceutical industry’s practice of charging 
inflated drug prices has resulted in pharmaceutical 
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company profits exceeding those of even the oil and 
investment banking industries. 
(e) Inflated drug pricing has led to drug companies 
lavishing excessive pay on their executives. 
(f) Excessively priced drugs continue to be an unnecessary 
burden on California taxpayers that ultimately results in 
cuts to health care services and providers for people in 
need. 
(g) Although California has engaged in efforts to reduce 
prescription drug costs through rebates, drug manufacturers 
are still able to charge the state more than other government 
payers for the same medications, resulting in a dramatic 
imbalance that must be rectified. 
(h) If California is able to pay the same prices for 
prescription drugs as the amounts paid by the United 
States Department of Veterans Affairs, it would result in 
significant savings to California and its taxpayers. This Act 
is necessary and appropriate to address these public 
concerns. 
SEC. 3. Purposes and Intent. 
The people of the State of California hereby declare the 
following purposes and intent in enacting this Act: 
(a) To enable the State of California to pay the same prices 
for prescription drugs as the prices paid by the United 
States Department of Veterans Affairs, thus rectifying the 
imbalance among government payers. 
(b) To enable significant cost savings to California and its 
taxpayers for prescription drugs, thus helping to stem the 
tide of rising health care costs in California. 
(c) To provide for the Act’s proper legal defense should it 
be adopted and thereafter challenged in court. 
SEC. 4. The California Drug Price Relief Act shall be
codified by adding Section 14105.32 to the Welfare and
 
 
Institutions Code, to read: 
14105.32. Drug Pricing. 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and insofar 
as may be permissible under federal law, neither the State 
of California, nor any state administrative agency or other 
state entity, including, but not limited to, the State 
Department of Health Care Services, shall enter into any 
agreement with the manufacturer of any drug for the 
purchase of a prescribed drug unless the net cost of the 
drug, inclusive of cash discounts, free goods, volume 
discounts, rebates, or any other discounts or credits, as 
determined by the State Department of Health Care 
Services, is the same as or less than the lowest price paid 
for the same drug by the United States Department of 
Veterans Affairs. 
(b) The price ceiling described in subdivision (a) also shall 
apply to all programs where the State of California or any 
state administrative agency or other state entity is the 
ultimate payer for the drug, even if it did not purchase the 
drug directly. This includes, but is not limited to, 
California’s Medi-Cal fee-for-service outpatient drug
program and California’s AIDS Drug Assistance Program. 
In addition to agreements for any cash discounts, free 
goods, volume discounts, rebates, or any other discounts 
or credits already in place for these programs, the 
responsible state agency shall enter into additional 
agreements with drug manufacturers for further price 
reductions so that the net cost of the drug, as determined 
by the State Department of Health Care Services, is the 
same as or less than the lowest price paid for the same 
 
drug by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. 
The requirements of this section shall not be applicable to 
drugs purchased or procured, or rates developed, pursuant 
to or under any Medi-Cal managed care program. 
(c) It is the intent of the people of the State of California 
that the State of California, and all state agencies and 
other state entities that enter into one or more agreements 
with the manufacturer of any drug for the purchase of 
prescribed drugs, shall implement this section in a timely 
manner, and to that end the State of California and all 
such state agencies and other state entities are required to 
implement and comply with this law no later than July 1, 
2017. 
(d) The State of California, and each and every state 
administrative agency or other state entity, may adopt rules 
and regulations to implement the provisions of this section, 
and may seek any waivers of federal law, rule, and 
regulation necessary to implement the provisions of this 
section. 
SEC. 5. Liberal Construction. 
This Act is an exercise of the public power of the people of 
the State of California for the protection of their health, 
safety, and welfare, and shall be liberally construed to 
effectuate its purposes. 
SEC. 6. Conflicting Measures. 
This Act is intended to be comprehensive. It is the intent 
of the people of the State of California that in the event 
this Act and one or more measures relating to the same 
subject shall appear on the same statewide ballot, the 
provisions of the other measure or measures shall be 
deemed to be in conflict with this Act. In the event that 
this Act receives a greater number of affirmative votes, the 
provisions of this Act shall prevail in their entirety, and all 
provisions of the other measure or measures shall be null 
and void. 
SEC. 7. Proponent Accountability. 
The people of the State of California hereby declare that 
the proponent of this Act should be held civilly liable in the 
event this Act is struck down, after passage, in whole or in 
part, by a court of law for being constitutionally or statutorily 
impermissible. Such a constitutionally or statutorily
impermissible initiative is a misuse of taxpayer funds and 
electoral resources and the Act’s proponent, as drafter of 
the Act, must be held accountable for such an occurrence. 
 
In the event this Act, after passage, is struck down in a 
court of law, in whole or in part, as unconstitutional or 
statutorily invalid, and all avenues for appeal have been 
exhausted, the proponent shall pay a civil penalty of 
$10,000 to the General Fund of the State of California for 
failure to draft and sponsor a wholly constitutionally or 
statutorily permissible initiative law but shall have no other 
liability to any person or entity with respect to, related to, 
or arising from the Act. No party or entity may waive this 
civil penalty. 
SEC. 8. Amendment and Repeal. 
This Act may be amended to further its purposes by statute 
passed by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature and signed 
by the Governor. 
SEC. 9. Severability. 
If any provision of this Act, or part thereof, or the 
applicability of any provision or part to any person or 
circumstances, is for any reason held to be invalid or 
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions and parts shall 
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not be affected, but shall remain in full force and effect, 
and to this end the provisions and parts of this Act are 
severable. The voters hereby declare that this Act, and 
each portion and part, would have been adopted irrespective 
of whether any one or more provisions or parts are found to 
be invalid or unconstitutional. 
SEC. 10. Legal Defense. 
The people of the State of California desire that the Act, if 
approved by the voters, and thereafter challenged in court, 
be defended by the State of California. The people of the 
State of California, by enacting this Act, hereby declare 
that the proponent of this Act has a direct and personal 
stake in defending this Act from constitutional or statutory 
challenges to the Act’s validity. In the event the Attorney 
General fails to defend this Act, or the Attorney General 
fails to appeal an adverse judgment against the 
constitutionality or statutory permissibility of this Act, in 
whole or in part, in any court of law, the Act’s proponent 
shall be entitled to assert its direct and personal stake by 
defending the Act’s validity in any court of law and shall be 
empowered by the citizens through this Act to act as agent 
of the citizens of the State of California subject to the 
following conditions: (1) the proponent shall not be 
considered an “at-will” employee of the State of California, 
but the Legislature shall have the authority to remove the 
proponent from their agency role by a majority vote of each 
house of the Legislature when “good cause” exists to do 
so, as that term is defined by California case law; (2) the 
proponent shall take the Oath of Office under Section 3 of 
Article XX of the California Constitution as an employee of 
the State of California; (3) the proponent shall be subject 
to all fiduciary, ethical, and legal duties prescribed by law; 
and (4) the proponent shall be indemnified by the State of 
California for only reasonable expenses and other losses 
incurred by the proponent, as agent, in defending the 
validity of the challenged Act. The rate of indemnification 
shall be no more than the amount it would cost the state 
to perform the defense itself. 
SEC. 11. Effective Date. 
Except as otherwise provided herein, this Act shall become 
effective the day after its approval by the voters. 
PROPOSITION 62 
This initiative measure is submitted to the people in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of Article II of 
the California Constitution. 
This initiative measure amends and repeals sections of the 
Penal Code; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be 
deleted are printed in strikeout type and new provisions 
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate 
that they are new. 
PROPOSED LAW 
The Justice That Works Act of 2016 
SECTION 1. Title. 
This initiative shall be known and may be cited as “The 
Justice That Works Act of 2016.”
 
SEC. 2. Findings and Declarations.
 
The people of the State of California do hereby find and 

declare all of the following:
 
1. Violent killers convicted of first degree murder must be 
separated from society and severely punished. 
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2. Under current law, California sentences many criminals 
to death who commit first degree murder, but the state 
rarely carries out executions. Instead, the state spends 
millions of taxpayer dollars providing lawyers for death row 
inmates, only to see the murderers it has sentenced to 
death by execution die of old age in prison. 
3. Since 1978, California has spent more than $4 billion 
on a death penalty system that has sentenced nearly one 
thousand criminals to death by execution but has executed 
only 13 people. Even though there are over 700 inmates 
now on death row, California has not executed anyone in 
almost eleven years. 
4. Violent murderers who are sentenced to serve life in 
prison without the possibility of parole in California are 
never eligible for parole. They spend the rest of their lives 
in prison and they die in prison. 
5. Fewer than 1% of death row inmates work and pay their 
wages to compensate their victims. Murderers sentenced 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are 
required to work in prison and use their wages to pay 
restitution to the victims of their crimes. 
6. All convicted murderers sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole should be legally required 
to work while in prison and pay 60% of their wages to 
compensate their victims for the damage they caused. 
7. While many think it is cheaper to execute murderers 
than to imprison them for life, in fact it is far more 
expensive. The death penalty system costs over $100 
million more per year to maintain than a system that has 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as its 
harshest punishment, according to a study by former death 
penalty prosecutor and judge, Arthur Alarcon, and law 
professor Paula Mitchell. By replacing the death penalty 
with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 
California taxpayers would save well over $100 million 
every year. 
8. The death penalty is a failed government program that 
wastes taxpayer dollars and makes fatal mistakes. More 
than 150 innocent people have been sentenced to death 
in this country, and some innocent people have actually 
been executed. Wrongful convictions rob innocent people 
of decades of their lives, waste tax dollars, and re-
traumatize the victims’ families, while the real killers 
remain free to kill again. 
9. Retroactive application of this act will end a costly and 
ineffective practice immediately and ensure that California 
never executes an innocent person. 
10. California’s death penalty is an empty promise. Death 
penalty cases drag on for decades. A sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole provides swift and 
certain justice for grieving families. 
11. Life in prison without the possibility of parole ensures 
that the worst criminals stay in prison forever and saves 
money. By replacing the death penalty with life in prison 
without the possibility of parole, we would save the state 
$1 billion in five years without releasing a single 
prisoner—$1 billion that could be invested in crime 
prevention strategies, services for victims, education, and 
keeping our communities and families safe. 
SEC. 3. Purpose and Intent. 
The people of the State of California declare their purpose 
and intent in enacting the act to be as follows: 
